Pedro A. A. Fonseca &Vítor L. Alves | Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE), Brazil
Introduction
The dispute for the South China Sea region intensified with the global risen importance that China has had throughout this century. Moreover, the disputed area has a great energetic potential, having petroleum (11 billion barrels) and gas reserves (190 trillion cubic meters), as well as fishing resources (10% of global production) and an important trade route where $5.3 trillion worth of goods are transported annually[1]. Finally, there is the American Foreign Policy in the region, also known as Pacific Pivot[2], in which affirms american vital interests in the Asian region, specially in Eastern Asia, and reassures that the country aims to be a determinant player in the region. These factors make the dispute in the region an important tension area in global geopolitics as well as a strong contemporary subject to the fields of International Politics, International Law and Security Studies.
On July 12th, 2016, a new outcome was unveiled in the dispute. The International Arbitral Court ruled against the historical chinese claims of the disputed territory through the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[3]. Despite the ruling, the People's Republic of China (PRC) rejected the veredict and kept enlarging its presence in the region, building artificial islands and installing military weapons and equipments on them. It is fair to notice that the dispute has been occurring throughout all the XXth Century, having intensified during the 70s and 80s, due to the findings of energy and fishing resources.
From this context, the present article will bring an analysis about the dispute in the South China Sea region, showing the historical context of the contentious since the beginning of the XXth Century untill nowadays. Then, it will present two theoretical perspectives about the dispute, using the Tsinghua strand of the Chinese School of International Relations and the Realist theory, seeking to show that the dispute dynamics can be contraditory, as stated by Koo (2017). Lastly, there will be a conclusio section
Historical Context
The disputes on the South China Sea (SCS) region date back to the beginning of the 20th Century, in which chinese cartographers delimited the SCS as a chinese territory (HONG, 2014). Later, in 1947, the region would be delimited by the nine-dash line, appeared in official maps in 1949. Since the 1980s, the disputes have escalated due to findings of great hydrocarbons reserves, beyond the fishing potential already known at the time. The turning point occurred in 1979, when China and Vietnam engaged in several battles, due to the vietnamese invasion to Cambodia, which was an ally of Beijing’s regime.
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Figure 1: Nine dash line |
Source: http://southchinasea.com/analysis/966-founded-nine-dash-line.html
This conflict, that had SCS dispute as a background, brought important consequences to the regional geopolitics. In first place, Hanoi allowed the use of the Cam Ranh Bay by the Soviet Union - and Russia, later on – until 2004, giving projection to Moscow at the area. Then, it allowed a re-approachment between Washington and Beijing, due to the fact that both nations saw in Moscow a threat to the region. At last, it evolved the relations between Beijing and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), because both looked upon the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there were other incidents involving countries of the disputed region, such as a new conflict between Beijing and Hanoi – in which Beijing came out winner again. It is fair to duly note the fact that Beijing hadn't physically occupied any islands until that turmoil (GUAN, 2000) During the 1990s, the Filipino government discovered that China had been building structures close to the Mischief Reef, which had been reivindicated by Manila. However, from the beginning of the new millenium, China and ASEAN have being proclaiming the Declaration of Conduct of the Parties of the South China Sea, where "all the reclaimers agreed to solve the territorial conflicts by pacific means, according to the universally acknowledged principles of the International Law". (CHEN, 2016, p.188)
Despite looking for cooperative means to solve the conflict, a new erosion has risen in the relations among the SCS countries starting from 2009. Chan and Li (2015) points out that Beijing has kept claiming the region to itself, despite having a diplomatic high cost with its neighbor countries. In 2012, during the 45th ASEAN ministerial meeting held in Cambodia, the Member States couldn't get upon an agreement[4] and, for the first time in 45 years "the
meeting did not issued a joint release due to disagreements over the handling of the disputes" (CHAN & LI, 2015)
Finally, on July 12th, 2016, in a unanimous decision, the International Arbitral Court ruled against the historical chinese claim upon the South China Sea, through the terms of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This legal process was initiated by the Phillippines in January of 2013, arguing against the legality of the nine-dash line and claiming areas considered as Filipino Special Economic Zone by its government[6]. The decision was rejected by the Chinese government. According to the chinese president, Xi Jinping, the disputed islands on the SCS have historically been chinese territories, and its territorial sovereignty and maritime interests on the Sea will not be affected by the decision[7].
Chinese School of International Relations and Realism
Before analyzing how the chinese school interprets the dispute, we will briefly point out the development of International Relations theories on China[9]. The construction of this thought is influenced by philosophers of the Imperial Period, as Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, by Marxist thinkers after the 1949 Socialist Revolution, as Lenin and Mao Zedong, and, from the 1990s, by western theories and thinkers, as Morgenthau. Those influences made possible the uprising of several thought lines commonly known as Chinese School of International Relations. The article will use the Tsinghua approach to comprehend the dynamics of the dispute on the South China Sea. To do so, the paper will talk about this approach, and then, how it interprets the dispute.
In his book entitled "Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power", Yan Xuetong, exponent of the Tsinghua approach, presents the pilars of this strand. To Zhang (2012), there are three characteristics that define the Tsinghua approach. The first one is its motivation, which originates in the desire of improving the contemporary theory of International Relations, and, equally important, draw policy lessons for China’s rise. Second, it attempts to draw this policy based on the political thinking of the so-called Golden Age of chinese philosophy - which is considered, by the author, as the main charateristic of the Tsinghua approach. And, lastly, the application of the scientific method to tehe analysis of the ancient chinese thought. Thus, the approach uses classical elements of chinese philosophy to improve the comprehension of contemporary phenomenas, or, as stated by Zhang and Chang (2016, p.6), "innovate applying the clasical thought to develop, supplement or even substitute actual theories".
According to Yan, China now has a different modus operandi, so-called Fen Fa You Wei, or Strive for conquest. Such perspective aims to co-opt its neighboring countries and align their interests with China's rise over time. A good example of this approach is the "One Belt, One Road" project, which will have a sea route passing through the South China Sea. In addition, China starts to differentiate countries as friends and enemies, in which its friends on the region will beneficiate from its rise, obtaining larger gains; while countries considered as hostiles by China will suffer retaliations, as economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.
Yan argues that the Chinese policies on South China Sea are "only meant to safeguard their own interests"[10] and the concern of the claiming countries as well as the American one is that "the previous policies were not vigorous enough". Thus, from this new turn of the chinese foreign policy, headed mainly by the President Xi Jinping, China seeks to have a hegemony in the region, avoiding the american model of conquers, as argued by Yan. This means that China will prefer to act through non-military actions.
b. Realism
The term Realism presupposes an uniform current. However, it should be noted that being one of the oldest theories of International Relations, there are innumerable strands. Therefore, it is necessary to better understand the differences between the realisms. On this topic, there will be presented two kinds of realism: the Offensive and the Defensive. Following this presentation, we will take the analyzed case and compare to see which fits it better.
According to Castro (2012), in its classical version, who has Machiavelli as its main exponent, Realism has seven premisses:
1. Human nature is selfish and individualistic, and this is reflected in the State, both internally and externally;
2. War is a political tool for the purpose of maximizing national strategies of survival and security;
3. The national State uses the maximization of power calculations against the endogenous and exogenous constraints;
4. Militarism and national defense policies are valid as means to obtain and/or keep power;
5. Low control of the international scenario forces the state actors tro prioritize their agendas towards others;
6. The National State as the main actor in the internatinal scenario;
7. Finally, States are placed in an irregular distribution of force-power-interest capital, thus generating power hierarchies in a given world order.
To Mearsheimer, exponent of the offensive realism, the big players in the international scenario are not content with the current distribution of power. Besides that, the author affirms that multipolar systems are more likely to engage in wars than bipolar ones, since there are more actors disputing their interests in the first system mentioned (MEARSHEIMER, 2001). On the other hand, defensive realism theorists, as Glaser and Kaufmann (1996), argue that it is more valid to have a balance between attack and defense power. That is the so-called attack-defense theory, or security dilemma theory.
The realist strand possess two points of view about the conflicts. One sees China as a threat to the regional stability, being able to unbalance the power balance in the region with its naval power; while the other sees the country, specially its naval power, not so powerful as it may seem. Yahuda (2013) exposes several develpoment points which can explain the Beijing’s behavior shift on the region. The first one speaks about the feeling of change of the power balance in its favor, mainly because, after 2008, disparities between the country and the United Stated have been diminishing fast, specially on the economical aspect. The second one mentions the chinese expansion of its national interests to include the maritime dominions in its adjacent seas (jinhai) and its consequent trade routes. The third point develops due to the participation in trainings and patrol and security operations, both in its waters and on international coalitions, like the operations against piracy in Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The last point portrays the growth of nationalist feelings, both between the government officials and the general population.
Although there is a consensus that the chinese behavior falls in the realm of the realistic theory, there is not a consensus about if the path of this behavior has been more offensive or defensive. Watthanatidpong (2014) illustrates this argument very well, showing the ambiguity of certain chinese policies on the region, as the offshore defense one, and its strategy to postpone its own actions can be faced such in an defensive or an offensive way.
In any case, even with China's allegation, in official documents, that it will not attack any country unless attacked first, its actions show the opposite. The non-compliance of the rule arbitrated by the UNCLOS and the construction of military bases in Spratly (Nansha) Islands makes the system even more unstable, making the countries all over the region to invest in the military industry. This scenario, as in accordance with Mearsheimer, can lead to tragedy – the armed conflict.
4. Conclusion
This present article sought to bring distinc theories to clarify the dynamics of this dispute. It is worth mentioning that Asian maritime geopolitics will tend to get more complex due to the rise of new player in the region, specially China. The country is taking a new stance in its foreign policy field and trying to create a new hegemony in the region. Besides that, there could be noted some conflictuous clashes in the future, due to the hegemonic dispute between China and the United States.
According to the Tsinghua approach, the chinese foreign policy is seen in a more positive way. This means that although China has shifted the way of its policies to a vision of being the hegemonic actor in the area, it does not seek to reach this status via military action. The country prefers to deal with the conflict with diplomacy and politics, as an observer with the conduct agreements with ASEAN or the economical cooperation with the rest of the regional actors. In this way, China seeks its goals through a new leadership model, as Yan points out. However, it is worth remembering that the great american interest in the dispute develops a concern on China, which makes the country seek for guarantees. To do so, the country seeks to strengthten its naval and air power on the region.
Using the realistic approach, we note that while China seeks being the hegemonic power in the region, its policies does not possess a clearly-offensive status when it comes to the maximization of its military power. In its own military strategy paper, it is said that the country will not attack, but will counterattack, if necessary[6]. In this way, the balance between its action taking and its tactic of avoiding direct confrontation indicates that the defensive realism possess a greater potential to explain the dynamics of the dispute and the players currently enrolled in the conflict.
5. Bibliography
CASTRO, T. Teoria das Relações Internacionais. Brasília: FUNAG. 2012.
CHAN, I.; LI, M. New Chinese Leadership, New Policy in the South China Sea Dispute?, Journal of Chinese Political Science. 2015.
CHEN, K. A Comparative Perspective on the South China Sea: Observations and Implications, Asian Security, 12:3, 188-193, 2016.
KOO, M. G. Belling the Chinese Dragon at Sea: Western Theories and Asian Realities, Ocean Development & International Law, 48:1, 52-68. 2013.
GUAN, C. The South China Sea Dispute Revisited, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 54:2, 201-215. 2000.
GLASER, C. L.; KAUFMANN, C. What is the offense-defense balance and can we measure it?(Offense, Defense, and International Politics). International Security, 22:4, 123. 1996.
HONG, Z. The South China Sea dispute and China ASEAN relations, Asian Affairs, 44:1, 27-43. 2013.
MACHIAVELLI, N. O Príncipe. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1996.
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[2] Available at: <https://admin.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/dod-asia-pacific-maritime-security-strategy.pdf>. Access in: April 25th, 2017.
[4] Available at: <http://apjjf.org/2012/10/34/Carlyle-A.-Thayer/3813/article.html> Access in: March 25th, 2017.
[5]Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-rulingphilippines.html> Access in: April 19th, 2017.
[6] Available at: <http://portuguese.people.com.cn/n3/2016/0713/c309806-9085411.html> Access in: April 21st, 2017.
[7] The term "Chinese School" is generalist, giving a fake idea of uniformity in the Chinese thought in International Relations. Actually, as stated by Shambaugh (2013), there are several schools of thought inside the so-called Chinese School of International Relations, in which there is a dialogue between them, despite their differences.
[9] Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/world/asia/china-foreign-policy-yanxuetong.html?_r=0> Access in: March 22nd, 2017.
[10] Available at: <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805_3.htm>. Access in: April 20th, 2017.
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